Abstract
Much communicative planning is consensus oriented and rests on ideas of deliberative democracy. Planning recommendations made by dialogue are based on the intellectual force of arguments giving reasoned rankings of the planning alternatives. Dialogue encompasses the amalgamation of arguments in accordance with democratic criteria ensuring the communicative rationality of the process and the legitimacy of the recommendation. The balancing and weighing of arguments should avoid decision cycles that would make the recommendation of a plan arbitrary. By an analogy with Arrow's theorem on the general impossibility of consistent and fair social choice, it is demonstrated that dialogue cannot ensure consistent recommendations and simultaneously prepare for political decision making in a democratic manner. The result is valid for debates over planning alternatives when differences in quality are not comparable across all the important arguments (concerning noise, safety, visual standard, social impact, etc.), which is the most common situation. discouraging results of social choice theory, for example, Arrow's (1963) general impossibility theorem. This article considers whether this recommendation is substantiated.
The core concept of the exposition is argument, which is here a statement offering a reasoned ordering of the planning alternatives (on an ordinal scale, interval scale, or ratio scale). As Habermas (1990) puts it, "Argumentation insures that all concerned in principle take part, freely and equally, in a cooperative search for truth, where nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument" (p. 198) . It is common in communicative planning theory to recommend that arguments be exchanged in accordance with the norms of Habermasian dialogue (Flyvbjerg 1998): Validity and truth are ensured where the participants in a given discourse respect five key processual requirements of discourse ethics: (1) no party affected by what is being discussed should be excluded from the discourse (the requirement of generality); (2) all participants should have equal possibility to present and criticize validity claims in the process of discourse (autonomy); (3) participants must be willing and able to empathize with each other's validity claims (ideal role taking); (4) existing power differences between participants must be neutralized such that these differences have no effect on the creation of consensus (power neutrality); and (5) participants must openly explain their goals and intentions and in this connection desist from strategic action (transparence). (p. 213) It is clear from the citation that dialogue has strong democratic properties, although it does not count votes or bow to preferences. Dialogue can be seen as a way of making decisions by fusing arguments informally and without algorithms. Scholars have pointed out the gap between ideals and possibilities of implementation in Habermas's critical theory of communicative action. Nevertheless, Habermasian dialogue remains an important theoretical reference point in communicative planning (Forester 1993; Healey 1999) . It is used here to characterize the process of deliberation, although the conclusions of the article apply equally well to similar processes described by, for example, Fishkin (1991) , Benhabib (1994) , Gutmann and Thompson (1996) , and implied by Rawls's (1996) notion of "public reason."
Assume now that there is a public planning debate about an identified choice set. The dialogue turns on the strong and weak sides of the planning alternatives X, Y, and Z and how their aspects should be balanced against each other to reach a comprehensive view of each planning proposal. Each argument (A) refers to a positive or negative aspect (e.g., noise from a planned highway) and lists the alternatives according to quality when only this single aspect is considered. When all the arguments are presented, the set of argument relations is established, for instance, A noise (X, Y, Z) A accessibility (Y, Z, X) A cost (Z, X, Y) Depending on the measurability of the aspects of quality, argument relations provide information about the alternatives yielding not only rankings but even quality differences and ratios. The dialogue establishes the set of argument relations and amalgamates these relations into an overall dialogic outcome relation (DO), for example,
DO(X, Y, Z).
The amalgamation of arguments leading to a dialogic outcome relation is here called a dialogic decision procedure. Hence, such a procedure produces a list of planning alternatives ordered according to their overall credentials. A transitive ordering is such that when planning alternative X is ranked higher than alternative Y, and Y is ranked higher than alternative Z, then X is ranked above Z. A cycle is produced by the dialogic decision procedure when, for one and the same set of argument relations, pairwise comparisons yield X > Y > Z > X, where > means "is ranked above." When the outcome relation is transitive, it does not cycle, and this is regarded as an indispensable requirement for consistency.
The problem is that the dialogic decision procedure may not give a unique outcome relation even if every argument relation is transitive. The argument relations above show two of them putting X before Y, two putting Y before Z, and two relations putting Z before X. Then the dialogic outcome relation will be unstable and might cycle, unless one has extra information saying, for instance, that the cost argument is much more important than the other two.
Social choice theory has shown that majority voting and other amalgamation of individual preferences can easily lead to decision cycles. The problem is mentioned in some basic textbooks (Patton and Sawicki 1993, 336) and decisionoriented literature for planners (O'Doherty 1996, chap. 1). The outcome of the decision is arbitrary with cycles, and hence it is also arbitrary whether the best alternative according to an impact assessment is actually chosen. To guarantee consistency, meaning that cycles are avoided, the decision procedure must have some rather undemocratic features, for example, dictatorship. The main thrust of Arrow's theorem and the associated literature is that there is an unresolvable tension between logicality and fairness. With democratic institutions, some social choices will be unordered and inconsistent (Riker 1982, 136) . Then, no meaningful choice can be made, and this erodes the legitimacy of majoritarian democracy. When decision cycles include top-ranked alternatives, the will of the people is not defined. This makes it difficult to give meaning to the pursuit of the public interest, which is often seen as the general goal of public planning.
Arrow's impossibility theorem has served as the foundation of profound scepticism about models of democracy based on majority voting or other decision rules amalgamating individual preferences (Riker 1982; Coleman and Ferejohn 1986) . The critique has increased the interest in deliberative models of democracy and spurred efforts to defend these and other models of democracy from the seemingly devastating implications of the impossibility theorems proved by social choice theorists (Christiano 1993; Mackie 1998) . Against this backcloth, and with the upswing of communicative planning, it is of interest to investigate whether dialogue and deliberation-with the weighing and balancing of arguments as a crucial phase-are also vulnerable to Arrow-type impossibilities. By a close analogy to Arrow's reasoning, the article argues that the logical problems present in the aggregation of preferences show up again in the fusing of arguments. While majority voting is based on amalgamation of individual preferences, deliberation requires some sort of (informal) amalgamation of arguments.
Communicative and collaborative planning may contribute to transforming governance cultures (Healey 1999, 116) . It draws on models of planning as interactive, discursive, conflictmediating, and consensus-building practices. According to Innes and Booher (1999a) , "Consensus building processes can change the players and their actions. They can produce new relationships, new practices, and new ideas" (p. 413). It is difficult to figure out in advance whether a process with such qualities will be successful. Sometimes it will, and with consensus, the Arrow type of problems vanishes. However, even when time and resources permit all the attractive features of consensus building to be fully worked out, the effort "may fail to produce any agreements or produce only low-quality ones" (p. 414). When the process ends, the ranking of the alternatives against each argument might still be such that a unique deliberative recommendation is impossible to reach by fair procedure. Hence, the capacity of consensus-building techniques to change important parameters during the planning process may save some deliberative processes from ending in a cycle, but it does not make the decision problem of the present article uninteresting.
The rest of the article is arranged in the following way. The first section deals with the "Requirements for Making Dialogic Decisions" and translates the conditions for Arrow's theorem to the present problem formulation. The section lists some democratic and fair conditions on the dialogic decision procedure that cannot be simultaneously respected if one wants to make sure that the dialogic outcome relation is transitive. Next follows a section presenting "An Impossibility Theorem for Dialogic Decision Making." There, Arrow's theorem is reinterpreted for deliberative planning and decision making, stating the impossibility of simultaneously guaranteeing democratic deliberation and recommendations that do not cycle. The section on "Generalization of the Impossibility Result" draws on more recent social choice research, contending that an Arrowtype dilemma is still present, even if the argument relations give more information than just the ranking of alternatives. It is argued that the argumentative analogy to the Arrow theorem is valid in nearly all cases of setting priorities among alternatives in land use and transport planning. Thereafter follows a "Discussion" section dealing with several objections to the argumentative reformulation of the Arrow theorem. Provided there are logical difficulties both with the amalgamation of individual preferences and arguments, what can be done in practice? This is the theme of the section on "Shifting Democratic Procedures: A Way Out?" I point to the advantages of alternating between majoritarian and deliberative decision making. Some consequences of the argumentative impossibility theorem for planning theory conclude the article.
᭤ Requirements for Making Dialogic Decisions on Plans with Intangible Consequences
In this section, the same logic as Arrow (1963) successfully applied to planning in the framework of welfare economics is applied to communicative planning. The conditions for his impossibility theorem of social choice are rephrased to fit this context, and it is argued that the reformulated conditions must be fulfilled by a dialogic decision procedure that is attractive in the sense of being communicatively rational.
Half a century ago, Arrow presented his pathbreaking results proving the impossibility of amalgamating individual preference rankings in a way that is both consistent (transitive) and democratic, given four seemingly innocuous assumptions.
1 However, the amalgamation of individual preferences is closer to political decision making and voting than to recommendations made on a professional basis. In the planning process preceding the final political decisions, the ideal is that impartial arguments should count more, while votes and personal preferences should count less. Fortunately, Arrow's assumptions and logic can be applied not only to individual preferences but even to other entities being amalgamated, for example, the event scores of a decathlon contest (MacKay 1980) , the individual judgments of welfare (Sen 1977) , or the consequences of a plan. Preferences do not need reasons to support them, but judgments and arguments do. As Beiner (1983) states, "Judgment . . . involves release from the confines of private subjectivity since we can support our judgments with publicly adducible reasons or grounds" (p. 8). Hence, there is no big step from applying Arrow's theorem to individual judgments to applying it to the aggregation of the arguments in Habermasian dialogue or similar deliberative processes. Of course, it has to be checked for each reformulation whether Arrow's assumptions remain reasonable and interesting. My aim here is to reinterpret Arrow's problem of social choice to fit the task of extracting a recommendation from the discussion about the qualities of alternative plans. The social choice theory of Arrow (1963) deals with the possibilities of consistently amalgamating individual preferences while observing a few conditions that seem essential to democratic and fair decision making. It will be seen that the requirements for a dialogic decision procedure discussed in this section are close analogies. Furthermore, the argument relation is a close analogy to Arrow's individual preference relation. Either type of relation orders the planning alternatives in accordance with a notion of merit, and in the present deliberative decision-making model as well as in the theory of social choice, the relations have to be fused to reach a collective decision.
By substituting arguments for individual preferences, analogies to Arrow's four fairness conditions are now presented, and it is explained why they are essential to the dialogic decision procedure when the planning debate involves intangibles. That is, the conditions are linked to the quotations of Habermas and Flyvbjerg in the introductory section, listing the requirements for dialogue. These requirements serve as normative guidelines both for critical pragmatism (Sager 1994, pt. 1) and collaborative planning (Innes and Booher 1999a, 418) .
Unrestricted Scope
The dialogic decision procedure should be able to process any (logically) coherent set of argument relations comprising any number of planning alternatives.
All that the impossibility result of the next section requires is at least two arguments and at least three planning alternatives that can be ordered against each of them in any possible sequence. In communicatively rational debate about planning matter, there should be no a priori censorship. The participants should be able to enter whatever arguments they really have, for whatever options they happen to be faced with, under no artificially imposed restraints. No argument and thus no party should be excluded from the deliberation process. There may be repugnant, irrelevant, intolerant, and egoistic arguments, but even these should be discussed and improved, although possibly discarded after testing, rather than ignored or prohibited at the outset. The public dialogue might itself have an educational, integrating, and "laundering" effect (Goodin 1986; Warren 1992 Warren , 1993 . In a dialogic decision procedure, a low weight on an argument should follow from low intellectual appeal, for example, due to faulty logic or violation of widely held ideas of rights, not from the powerlessness of those defending the argument. The reasoning supporting the argument relation should determine its weight, and it is this reasoning and not the ordering itself that should be checked by dialogue. The dialogic decision procedure should allow for the possibility that a new and valid argument might be advanced, implying a politically unpopular priority succession of the options, even if other arguments implying the same ordering have been shown to be logically invalid or ethically repellent.
Pareto Principle
When planning alternative X is of higher quality than alternative Y with reference to every argument without exception, the dialogic decision procedure must rank X above Y. This is a democratic requirement implying that plan Y should not be chosen when nobody has provided a reason why any of its qualities should be regarded as superior to those of plan X. Everything accepted as a valid argument in the debate indicates that X is the best solution, and thus there is consensus among the arguments. If Y is chosen and somebody is satisfied with the result, it means that he or she has got his or her will without being able to back his or her standpoint by a single acceptable argument. In a case like that, one would suspect that existing inequalities of power between participants have not been neutralized. If the Pareto principle is not respected, it means that other criteria than the intellectual force of the good argument are of significance to the collective decision, and this runs contrary to communicative rationality.
Nondominance (Nondictatorship)
The dialogic decision procedure should not automatically make the priority sequence of any single argument relation the ordering of the dialogic outcome relation, regardless of the priority sequences of all the other argument relations.
In other words, arguments must be nondominant, and this is a direct analogy to Arrow's nondictatorship condition. Without this requirement, an individual regarding his or her interests as well served by the dominant argument would be able to play the role of a dictator. An acceptable dialogic decision procedure should be a collective choice procedure, not merely
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Sager rubber-stamping one-person rule or one-argument fanaticism (McKay 1980, 8) . The basic premise of dialogue and public deliberation is that there is something to debate; that is, there should be at least two criteria or valid arguments making an impression on the conclusion. Their relative influence is what the dialogue is all about. With one argument being all-important compared to the rest, the outcome of deliberation would be given in advance. Then, one would suspect an invitation to dialogue from the proponents of the dominant argument to be insincere and to be a case of strategic action.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA)
The dialogic decision procedure should yield an ordering (DO) of a given set of planning alternatives depending only on the ranking of those alternatives against each of the arguments.
The effect of the ordering part and the independence part of this requirement is to place certain constraints on the information that an acceptable dialogic decision procedure can respond to.
First, the ordering part: the dialogic outcome relation should depend on, and only on, the ranking of planning alternatives against each argument. Then, plan X can be better than, worse than, or just as good as plan Y. This means measurement on an ordinal scale, where quality differences and quality ratios are not recorded. The ranking requirement makes sure that the dialogic decision is based on information that can be available and reliable even when the items to be ordered are intangibles. However, for many arguments, one can do more than just rank the alternatives. If the argument is, for example, that plan X is more costly than plan Y, the difference both in dollars and as a percentage might be known. The ranking restriction then means throwing away easily available and valuable information. The ordering part of the IIA requirement is thus obviously restrictive but still reasonable when the debate is dealing with intangibles. Such debates are common when setting priorities among plans with consequences for the natural environment, social networks, human health, cultural heritage, and aesthetic quality.
Second, the independence part: in generating a dialogic outcome relation over a given set of alternatives, only rankings of those alternatives (and no others) are to be taken into account. Hence, the rankings cannot be affected by plans not in the set from which the actual choice is being made. Independence requires that the way members of any subgroup of alternatives get ranked in the dialogic outcome relation over the whole choice set be independent of information concerning alternatives not in that subgroup. A pair being a subgroup, the relative position of any pair in the dialogic outcome relation must depend only on information concerning that pair (McKay 1980, 79) . One obvious advantage is that the condition limits the costs of social decision making. To rank X and Y, it is not necessary to spend resources gathering and processing information on other alternatives. Another important advantage is that the pairwise-choice format turns out to be a way of guaranteeing noncreativity, meaning that the dialogic decision procedure does not arbitrarily create the data to which it then responds. We want the decision procedure to be sensitive to nothing but the ranking of the planning alternatives in the choice set against each argument put forward in the dialogue. Noncreativity protects against some manipulation, although not against false estimation of quality in the argument relations (analogous to false revelation of preference in Arrow's context).
An example of creativity would be to rank the alternatives by the digits 1, 2, 3, and so on from the perspective of each argument and then identify the socially best option by performing arithmetic calculations on these created numbers. Different winners can emerge by selecting different numbers to indicate each rank and different arithmetic operations to aggregate the ranks given to each alternative. Hence, there is a possibility of manipulative creativity.
Summing up so far: the IIA requirement is kept in this and the next section to underline the close analogy with Arrow's theorem. Therefore, only when a recommendation is to be made from a set of plans with intangible consequences does it seem reasonable to impose the reformulated Arrow conditions on the amalgamation of arguments. The conditions ensure a minimum level of fairness in the public deliberation process. The next section restates Arrow's impossibility theorem to concur with dialogic decision making.
᭤ An Impossibility Theorem for Dialogic Decision Making
This section explains why decision cycles should be avoided in communicative planning and presents a theorem stating the impossibility of a democratic and consistent dialogic decision procedure in planning debates involving intangibles.
Transitive orderings are assumed by Arrow (1963) and are also assumed here. With argumentative decision cycles including the top-ranked alternatives, the best choice cannot be identified, and it is arbitrary which planning alternative will be recommended on the basis of the dialogic outcome relation. The same set of argument relations can then lead to very different collective choices. Communicative rationality does not agree with the conclusion that being guided by the intellectual force
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of the arguments can lead us anywhere. Decision cycles thus ruin the meaningfulness of dialogue. Moreover, as Chamberlin (1986) shows, the observation of a decision cycle is, under a wide variety of circumstances, an accurate indication of whether the outcome has been manipulated. In most cases, a cycle means that somebody has tried to influence the collective recommendation by revealing false preferences. This insincere and strategic action violates the conditions for communicative rationality outlined in the introduction.
In the context of aggregating individual preferences, Arrow (1963) proved that unrestricted scope, the Pareto principle, nondictatorship, and IIA cannot be combined when a guarantee against decision cycles is required. By analogy, the impossibility theorem of dialogic decision making can now be formulated:
No dialogic decision procedure can combine nondominance, the Pareto principle, unrestricted scope, and IIA when arbitrary planning decisions due to decision cycles are unacceptable.
The theorem above is stated in terms very similar to those used by Arrow (1963) to accentuate the analogy with his reasoning. Two alternative formulations are given below to simplify and make the theorem more informative to planners. The first restatement clarifies the context in which the theorem is valid and states the fairness requirements in argumentative terms. The second restatement simplifies further and substitutes the social choice terms with notions more commonly used in planning theory.
A few terminological explanations are needed for the first restatement. It is assumed that information on intangible goals and effects of a plan is generated by ordinal measurement only. When the term argumentative is linked to nondominance or other qualities, it means that the nondominance or other qualities are characteristics of the dialogic decision procedure fusing arguments. Respect for argumentative unanimity is another way of expressing respect for the Pareto principle. Uncensored ranking is meant to cover the requirement of unrestricted scope, focusing on the important claim that any ranking of the planning alternatives against an argument be permitted by the dialogic decision procedure. The inconsistency can then be reformulated:
Dialogic decisions based on debates involving intangibles cannot always escape cycles and manipulative creativity while simultaneously respecting argumentative nondominance, argumentative unanimity, and uncensored ranking.
Some of the environmental effects of a plan can usually be quantified, while others cannot. In most cases, there is sparse quantifiable information on how changes of the environment influence people's quality of life. The term broad environmental issue in the next restatement of the theorem refers to an assessment comprising several environmental impacts, including some whose significance to people can only be ranked (like the visual quality of different plans). Cycle-free decisions were presented as a condition for consistency in the introductory section, which also defined communicative rationality by quotations from Flyvbjerg and Habermas. It should be clear from the previous section that arguments must be nondominant, argumentative unanimity must be respected, alternatives must be honestly ranked against each argument, and rankings must be uncensored to make the deliberation process communicatively rational. Hence, we obtain the following simple restatement of the theorem:
No dialogic procedure for making decisions on broad environmental issues can simultaneously ensure consistency and communicative rationality.
The theorem shows that public deliberation does not solve all logical and democratic problems of collective decision making. There is a conflict between consistency and democracy in communicative planning based on the amalgamation of arguments, as in decision making based on the aggregation of individual preferences. Given that a nonarbitrary recommendation of planning alternative is called for, the impossibility theorem above demonstrates that even virtually weak democratic requirements have to be moderated and traded off.
I follow the reasoning of Saari (1998) in seeking to convey an intuitive understanding of the dialogic impossibility theorem. It was required early in this section that advice on public plans be transitive to avoid cycling and thus indeterminate recommendations. This implies that the ranking of the planning alternatives against each argument has to be transitive, or else the Pareto principle might force acceptance of collective intransitivity. Given the importance of these precautions against cycling, the IIA condition means trouble, because it does not distinguish transitive and intransitive rankings. IIA accepts any ranking as long as the ordering of, say, alternatives A and B follows only from information on A and B. The condition explicitly prevents the planners from taking into account information on sequences of pairwise ranking of alternatives, yet such information is necessary to decide whether rankings are transitive. "But, if the procedure strips all information about transitivity from the inputs, then there is absolutely no reason to expect rationality to suddenly arise in the outputs" (Saari 1998, 248) . This explains the impossibility theorem for dialogic decision making as well as Arrow's result.
It will now be investigated whether it is really necessary to limit the above theorem to debates involving intangibles.
᭤ Generalization of the Impossibility Result
The aim of this section is to show that the scope of the impossibility theorem of dialogic decision making is much wider than one is led to believe from the direct analogy with Arrow's reasoning. It is argued that the theorem is valid for nearly all cases of making recommendations from a societal point of view in land use and transport planning.
Arrow (1963) took individual utility to be ordinal and noncomparable. The last assumption implies that utility levels or changes in utility cannot be compared across individuals. It has been known for some years that the possibility of aggregating the individual preference relations is critically dependent on their measurability and comparability. Research in social choice theory after the establishment of Arrow's theorem has explored the exact nature of this dependence (Roberts 1980; Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark 1984; Kelsey 1987) . There is very little room for sensible social choice when interpersonal comparison of utility is not allowed. In fact, it has been proved that an equivalent to Arrow's theorem still holds with cardinally measurable, noncomparable utility.
2 Sen (1986) concludes that "while cardinality without interpersonal comparability does not change matters as far as the Arrow impossibility result is concerned, interpersonal comparability without cardinality does, however, make a real difference" (p. 1115). Once interpersonal comparisons are introduced, the impossibility problem, in the appropriately redefined framework, vanishes. Kelsey (1987) proves an Arrow-type impossibility theorem that neither restricts measurement to ranking nor limits the ranked items to individual preferences. His result therefore points toward the generalized impossibility theorem for the dialogic decision procedure presented below. 3 Kelsey does not require ordinality, and he aggregates "criteria" that can encompass the arguments of deliberation as well as individual preferences. Since either type of item can be included, Kelsey's impossibility theorem implies that a combination of deliberation and majority voting does not necessarily escape Arrowtype impossibilities. The task is now to provide an interpretation of the social choice results above fitting the present argumentative context. Imagine that the planning alternatives in the choice set are characterized by their costs and their effects on traffic noise, energy consumption, traffic safety, and agricultural land. The arguments of the debate are then associated with impacts measured in dollars, decibels, joules, accidents, and acres, respectively. All the argument relations order the planning alternatives on ratio scales, but even so, it is not known how large the improvements on the various scales must be to make them equivalent. The argument relations are thus noncomparable, and this means that the impossibility theorem of the preceding section is valid and can be generalized:
When argument relations are noncomparable, dialogue cannot ensure consistent recommendations and simultaneously prepare for political decision making in a (noncreative and) democratic manner, that is, by uncensored priority setting, respecting argumentative unanimity, and observing argumentative nondominance.
The preceding paragraphs show that this theorem is valid not only when intangibles are considered and ordinal scales are used. On the other hand, it does not hold when there is interargument comparability. This is the case when all the arguments concerning the plans in the choice set are gauged in monetary units or on a common point-rating scale ensuring that points are equivalent no matter which argument they refer to. However, this condition is not often met in land use or transport planning. It happens far more frequently that some of the arguments refer to impacts measured on comparable scales. Some of the cost-benefit arguments can often be calculated in money terms and thus be added up. This means that several arguments are amalgamated to a more general and significant argument. The summation nevertheless leaves us with a situation in which the impossibility theorem is still relevant (Roberts 1977) , provided the setting of priorities must also take into account other arguments ordering the plans on noncomparable scales.
It follows from the above paragraph that deliberative decision making can simultaneously ensure consistency and communicative rationality only in atypical cases where all measurement scales are comparable. Communicative planning, whether molded into critical pragmatism (Forester) , consensus building (Innes) , or collaborative planning (Healey) , must consequently renounce on communicative rationality to yield consistent recommendations.
4 This is not the discovery of a major weakness of communicative planning, however. Rather, it confirms the necessity of a practice already well established in all these deliberative styles: one should not worship the ideal speech situation but counteract communicative distortions when it is feasible, promote equal opportunities, and help to build support for a reasonably effective and fair plan (Forester 1993, 3) . This is clear from Healey's (1999) reworking and positioning of Habermas's approach to communicative action in an institutionalist perspective and from the framework for evaluating collaborative planning developed by Innes and Booher (1999a) . The next section deals with some critical points raised against the social choice analogy leading to the impossibility theorems of this article.
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The present approach to the analysis of deliberative decision making can be criticized from several angles. The most profound critique relates to the way dialogue is construed as a decision-making process, and this theme opens the discussion.
Is Aggregation of Arguments Part of Dialogue?
Is it reasonable to treat decision making by dialogue (or deliberation in general) as the aggregation of arguments? Aggregation entails assessing the strength of each argument and then forming an overall opinion on the basis of its relative appeal to logic and values. Rittel (1972) shares the view that aggregation of arguments is an important part of deliberation:
The planning process of wicked-problem solving must be understood as an argumentative process.
Each question of decision can be combined with an argument and actually we do this all the time: we deliberate our judgement and what is deliberation other than identifying and weighing pros and cons? (P. 395) A similar point of view is put forward by Manin (1987, 359) . Other authors, for example, Braaten (1987) , distinguish sharply between dialogue and the summing up of arguments. Surely, the dialogue embraces far more than a weighed summation. It does, for example, clarify the meaning of arguments and the conditions under which an argument is valid. And it may specify contexts in which an argument should be attributed higher or lower significance than usual. The logic of the present approach does not depend on dialogue being nothing but the balancing and weighing of arguments. However, in many cases, disagreement remains even after extensive discussion and clarification of the problem and the positions of the interested parties. The line of reasoning in this article rests on acceptance of the following contention: a stage is usually reached in deliberative decision making at which the parties will test the possibilities of consensus (or even try to strike a compromise) by weighing and amalgamating arguments in a manner logically similar to the procedures used when aggregating individual preferences in social choice theory.
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Can Arguments Be "Aggregated" in the Same Sense as Individual Preferences? Frohock (1980 Frohock ( , 1987 answers that they cannot, and he distinguishes sharply between a "fusing formulae for reasons" (Frohock 1980, 380) and arithmetic combination of preferences. Frohock's view would be that the reasoned determination of which plan to implement is not a matter of combining ordered units but of exploring the considerations supporting one course of action versus another. My view is that both approaches are acceptable and that the need to aggregate (or fuse or combine or amalgamate) the arguments is usually still present after examining the considerations supporting the various planning alternatives. This aggregation can be made explicitly and mathematically or as a concealed process of the mind. If only the last possibility were open, it would imply a lethal stroke against common planning practice. This is because most evaluation techniques, like the cost-benefit analysis, are based on formal aggregation of arguments. The view taken here is that such technique is logically valid.
Are There Logical Problems in Establishing the Argument Relations?
In a public debate, an argument is usually not put forward by only one person. And even when it is, several people are likely to support it once it is presented, and they will take an interest in how the alternative plans are ordered against the argument. Hence, establishing the orderings of the argument relations entails collective decision making. This collective decision problem is less complicated than recommending a planning alternative, however. The main reason is that there is (almost) no need to set weights. The many different properties of the plan do not have to be balanced against each other to rank the alternatives from the perspective of, for example, the noise argument. The ranking of alternatives against a single argument can often rest on an expert recommendation, at least to a large extent. Except for subjective arguments like aesthetics, it might be expedient to detail and divide up arguments to the level where agreement is found or expert opinion is accepted to avoid social choice problems concerning argument relations. When this is done, argument relations can be taken as given prior to deliberation, which is an analogy to Arrow's assumption of given individual preferences.
Are Cycles Present Only When Arguments Are Incomplete?
Sometimes one might strongly feel that the identified arguments are insufficient to reach an unambiguous recommendation and thus tolerate cycles. They might be seen as a natural consequence of inadequate information or insufficient deliberation; the problem in question has quite simply not been thoroughly analyzed. However, nothing in the logic of the 374 Sager theorems above suggests that simultaneous achievement of consistency and communicative rationality will be more likely with a more complete set of arguments. Decision cycles can be generated whether the problem at hand is thoroughly analyzed or not. Moreover, there are no well-founded criteria for deciding whether the analysis has been comprehensive, that is, whether a cycle is reasonable or not. So, acknowledging that the analysis is sometimes incomplete does not point a way out of the dilemma. Admittedly, some important questions are raised rather than conclusively answered in this brief discussion. I believe nonetheless that the critique of the argument-fusing approach to deliberative decision making can be countered along the lines indicated in this section. The next task is to suggest how the recommendation of plans can proceed, given conflict between consistency and democracy both in majoritarian and deliberative decision processes.
᭤ Shifting Democratic
Procedures: A Way Out?
Several strategies have been proposed to circumvent Arrow's original impossibility theorem. Some scholars suggest that the problem can be solved by supplementing the arithmetic aggregation of individual preferences with deliberation. However, this strategy is not a way out of the dilemma, as the preceding sections show that deliberation creates its own logical impossibilities. The present section comments on some attempts at escaping the original Arrow paradox. It is argued that metacycling-that is, repeated switching between different democratic decision-making approaches-may be an escape route when aggregation of both arguments and preferences can lead to decision cycles.
The discussion starts with a brief review of recent literature on the relationship between deliberation and aggregation of individual preferences in social decision making. Miller (1993) does not see the deliberative ideal of democracy as a general way out. Even if public dialogue can "launder" preferences (Goodin 1986 ) and sometimes make them single peaked, 6 there is no guarantee that preferences will be sufficiently changed to avoid cycles in democratic decision making.
Miller argues that the political process will usually reach a point where the consensus seeking has to be broken off because of time limits or lack of deliberative resources. Then, the social choice will be made by voting, and the contradictions highlighted by Arrow's theorem can again cause problems. Knight and Johnson (1994) argue against the view that the point of deliberation is to change individual preferences so as to achieve consensus. In their view, the point is to avoid decision cycles by discussing what are the main dimensions of the planning problem and come to a high degree of agreement about the important trade-offs. Such clarifications are needed to produce single-peaked preferences (Riker 1982, 123-28) . Neither Miller (1993) nor Knight and Johnson (1994) bring to our attention the inherent logical problems of deliberation. Taking the impossibility theorem of the present article into account, it does not sound entirely convincing that the main point of deliberation is to counteract decision cycles. I do, however, agree with the conclusion reached by Knight and Johnson (1994) that "even when combined, aggregation (of preferences, TS) and deliberation cannot insure stable democratic outcomes" (p. 288). Frohock (1980 Frohock ( , 1987 regards social choice as the making of moral decisions. Such decisions should be made by deliberation and "reasoned synthesis" rather than the arithmetic combination rules searched for by Arrow. A moral choice will select the alternative with the stronger supporting reasons. While the present article directs attention to the aggregation of arguments, Frohock (1980) prefers searching for a fusing formula for reasons: "The need to establish a reasoned priority among alternatives marks off moral outcomes as fusing efforts, where . . . the conditions for orderings are themselves the material for orderings" (p. 380). The fusing formulae result in argumentative synthesis, and then a social choice can be made by "representing a rational dominance of one set of reasons" (p. 380). To Frohock, deliberation is a way of circumventing Arrow's theorem. He does not identify inherent logical problems in the fusing of reasons, and he therefore concludes that "if the combination rules are replaced by argumentative synthesis, then the theorem is gone" (p. 381). Warren (1996) suggests that a democratic conception of authority is required to make public deliberation work in practice. This is because there is a scarcity of deliberative resources for any individual. "Limitations of time, expertise, and attention . . . converge to limit radically individual participation and, conversely, to induce pressures for other kinds of decision making" (Warren 1996, 46) . Hence, disputes will often be settled by voting instead of consensus, and the limited suspension of judgment implied by authority might help to coordinate individual preferences and point a way out of Arrow's original impossibility of fair social choice. However, authority does not necessarily help when arguments are the items to be aggregated. Even if most people should accept suspending their judgement to a democratic authority, the set of arguments may well be unchanged, and the logical problems of fusing them on the basis of their intellectual force still linger. The democratic conception of authority as conceived by Warren is no solution when logical difficulties are embedded in the amalgamation of both arguments and preferences.
Democratic deliberation has been shown to generate logical impossibilities of its own, and hence dialogue is in itself no way out of Arrow-type social choice problems. It is typical for the literature in the borderland between political science and social choice theory (e.g., the contributions discussed in this section) to treat deliberation and preference aggregation differently in the social decision-making framework. Deliberation is often treated as a supplement, possibly helpful in circumventing the logical problems of majority voting. There is no convincing reason, however, to regard the aggregation of preferences as the pivotal activity and the fusing of arguments as secondary. With the central position of critical pragmatism, consensus building, and other communicative approaches in contemporary planning literature, this asymmetry should not be adopted by planning theorists. Besides, it will now be argued that a more evenhanded view of collective decision making by aggregating arguments and preferences is required to mitigate the potential cycling problems of either process.
Decision cycles in democratic processes might be alleviated by raising the "cyclical" motion to the level of choice between social decision-making methods, for instance, by switching from deliberation to preference elicitation and back to further deliberation and so forth. An iterative sequence of this sort may create an understanding of the choice problem and a set of individual preferences less likely to produce decision cycles. To the extent that deliberation is important to political decision making, the representation of viewpoints should count more than the representation of individuals. As long as the competing views are represented and recommendations are made purely by impartial argument, the number of people backing each planning alternative should matter less. Deliberation brackets preferences and voting brackets the giving of reasons, but shifting between these decision-making modes can bring both types of information into play.
This iterative process is often observed in politics, which helps to explain why decision cycles do not occur as frequently in practice as predicted by social choice theory (Tullock 1981) . Preferences are gradually clarified in committees, political councils, advisory bodies, and consultative assemblies. Each round of eliciting preferences and mapping the possibility of coalitions gives information about what trade-offs and other problematic issues need to be further discussed. Each new round of public debate affects knowledge and preferences to some extent, increasing agreement on the central issue dimension, it is hoped, and thus promoting single-peakedness and transitivity. Moving back and forth between aggregation of preferences and arguments increases the likelihood of reaching a situation in which it is possible to draw an inference from the public deliberation or count the votes without ending up in a decision cycle. Some further conclusions are listed in the next section.
᭤ Conclusions: Consequences of the Argumentative Impossibility Theorem for Planning Theory
The present study examines some logical problems of arriving at planning recommendations through public deliberation. The main conclusions of the study are listed below:
• Deliberation and dialogue produce recommendations by amalgamating arguments, while voting schemes lead to decisions by aggregating individual preferences.
• The ideal of consistent and democratic collective decision making is not fulfilled by abandoning the welfare economic framework based on self-interest and individual utility maximization to the advantage of the seemingly more idealistic requirements of Habermasian dialogue.
• Planning recommendations founded on argumentative synthesis face similar problems as political decisions based on individual preferences and votes when aiming to combine nonarbitrary solutions with democratic procedures: only in atypical cases when all measurement scales are comparable can deliberation simultaneously ensure consistency and communicative rationality.
• Assuming that both critical pragmatism and collaborative planning satisfy the argumentative-fairness conditions (outlined in the second section), deliberative planning in either style should be expected to sometimes recommend unstable and arbitrary solutions.
• The likelihood of successfully combining democracy with cycle-free planning recommendations can increase with repeated shifting between different democratic procedures, for example, between deliberation and eliciting preferences from committees preparing the issue for the final political vote. Such metacycling does not detract from the intelligibility of planning processes.
In the context of preference aggregation, a high concentration of power is unavoidable to guarantee cycle-free decisions. In the deliberative context, the analogy is that a subset of arguments (say, those affecting the ecological system) decides the winning option or can at least prevent a particular alternative from being chosen. Without some discrimination between the arguments, a certain susceptibility of cycles will remain. That is, even with an unchanged set of argument relations and fully objective and impartial deliberations, the recommended alternative might be X after one debate and Y or Z after another. It is fully acceptable, however, that some arguments in a deliberative process have greater intellectual force than others and thus carry more weight in making the decision. Although argumentative dominance is not considered democratic, substantial discrimination between arguments is in harmony with 376 Sager democracy and can reduce the probability of cycles. Hence, the fairness versus consistency trade-off may be less pressing in critical pragmatism and collaborative planning than with a majoritarian voting procedure putting equal weights on the individual-preference rankings. The difference between communicative processes can affect the set of participants, the set of alternatives, and the set of arguments. The larger the sets and the more equal the status of their member units, the more instability. Other things being equal, the probability of cycling will be less for the communicative planning style most willing to structure the process, that is, impose restrictions favoring one alternative more than another. But this is exactly what might lead to an undemocratic and unfair procedure.
Although it is widely agreed in Western political science that public deliberation and dialogue are an indispensable part of a living democracy, there are critical voices (Gardner 1996; Sanders 1997; Walzer 1989) . A more balanced view also seems to be emerging in planning theory. The argumentative impossibility theorem complements recently surfacing critique contending that dialogic planning processes might not be as fair and democratic in practice as suggested by communicative planning theorists (Huxley and Yiftachel 2000) . In particular, Tewdwr-Jones and Allmendinger (1998) find it "ironic that a process concerned with transparency in communication seems to impose assumptions upon the process, such as participatory democracy 'good,' representative democracy 'bad'" (p. 1977) . Should this criticism of communicative planning be warranted, it is hoped that the impossibility theorem of this article will contribute to the elimination of the bias.
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᭤ Notes
1. The formulation of the Arrow conditions here is adapted from McKay (1980) . Unrestricted scope requires that an acceptable amalgamation device be able to process any (logically) coherent set of individual preference rankings of any number of choice alternatives. The Pareto principle requires that when every individual prefers X to Y, the amalgamation device must rank X above Y in its social ordering. That is, whatever else it may do, an acceptable device must honor unanimity. Non-dictatorship prohibits an acceptable device from taking the preferences of any single individual and automatically making them the social ordering regardless of the preferences of all other individuals. Independence of irrelevant alternatives requires that the social ordering of a given set of alternatives depend only on the individuals' preference orderings of those alternatives. The most thorough and least demanding explanation of Arrow's theorem is offered by Saari (1998) .
2. The Arrow-type theorem relevant to cardinally measurable, noncomparable preference relations is proved by Sen (1970, Theorem 8*2); Blackorby, Donaldson, and Weymark (1984, Corollary 4.1); and Sen (1986, 1115) .
3. Kelsey (1987) reformulates the conditions of unrestricted scope, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and the Pareto principle to suit his problem definition and denotes them U*, I*, and P*, respectively. There are r criteria to be aggregated, of which g j is one. P means "preferred to" in his theorem, which is cited below:
Theorem 1: If an aggregate welfare functional satisfies conditions U*, I* and P*, there are a finite number of criteria, at least three social states and no comparisons between different criteria are possible, then there exists j, such that for any g 1 , g 2 , . . . , g r and any pair of alternatives (x, y): g j (x) > g j (y) implies xPy.
The conclusion of Theorem 1 says that there exists some criterion j which has lexicographic priority over the others in determining the social ordering. It might be argued that this result is not as negative as the Arrow Theorem since the criteria (sic) which has priority does not necessarily correspond to an individual's utility and so we cannot conclude that there is a dictator. (P. 306) Kelsey reasons within the framework of welfare economics. His aim is to combine individual utility and nonutility information to produce an indicator of social welfare. This is not generally the aim when combining the arguments in deliberative democracy or communicative planning.
4. Sager (1994, chap. 1) describes "dialogic incrementalism" as a mode of planning strongly aiming for communicative rationality. It can now be concluded that, to the extent that it succeeds, dialogic incrementalism will occasionally yield inconsistent recommendations.
5. The fusing of arguments is not necessarily algorithmic, but Lehrer and Wagner (1981) present such a procedure. When no further discussion would change anyone's point of view, they use social information to proceed toward consensus. This information is about the merits of the participants advancing the arguments. Hence, the procedure of Lehrer and Wagner violates the conditions for communicative rationality spelled out in the introductory section.
6. Transitivity is guaranteed with single-peaked preferences, and such preferences are quite likely when there is only one issue dimension (Riker 1982, chap. 5.C) . For instance, when participants agree that trading off traffic safety and time savings is the central issue in the assessment of alternative road plans. A set of preference rankings, one for each member of the group, is single peaked if some ordering of the alternatives on the horizontal axis allows every individual preference ranking to be drawn as a singlepeaked curve. Such a curve may, for example, be sloping upward to a particular point and then sloping downward. 
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